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The political significance of generations -- The contemporary generations in American politics -- The political behavior of generations over time -- The generational gap on public policy -- Demographic divides among the generations -- The generational race gap -- Generational replacement and the future of American politics.

The dilemma of congressional representation -- The race disconnect -- The gender disconnect -- The religious disconnect -- The wealth disconnect -- The generation disconnect -- The causes and consequences of congressional underrepresentation

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Illustrations -- CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO GAPOLOGY -- The Concept of "Gapology" -- The United States in Red and Blue -- A Culture War? -- The Gapology of American Politics -- CHAPTER 2: THE INCOME GAP -- Income and American Political Behavior -- The Income Gap in the 2008 and 2012 Elections -- Income and Public Policy Preferences -- The Education Gap -- The Significance of the Income Gap -- CHAPTER 3: THE RELIGION GAP -- Religion and American Political Behavior -- The Religion Gap in the 2008 and 2012 Elections -- Religion and Public Policy Preferences -- Religion and the Cultural Divide -- The Changing Dynamic of the Religion Gap -- The Significance of the Religion Gap -- CHAPTER 4: THE GENDER GAP -- Gender and American Political Behavior -- The Gender Gap in the 2008 and 2012 Elections -- Gender and Public Policy Preferences -- The Marriage Gap -- The Significance of the Gender Gap -- CHAPTER 5: THE RACE GAP -- Race and American Political Behavior -- The Race Gap in the 2008 and 2012 Elections -- Race and Public Policy Preferences -- The Significance of the Race Gap -- CHAPTER 6: THE AGE GAP -- Age and American Political Behavior -- The Age Gap in the 2008 and 2012 Elections -- Age and Public Policy Preferences -- The Significance of the Age Gap -- CHAPTER 7: THE GEOGRAPHY GAP -- Geography and American Political Behavior -- Geography and Public Policy Preferences -- The Significance of the Geography Gap -- CHAPTER 8: THE IMPLICATIONS OF GAPOLOGY -- The Gaps and Vote Choice -- The Gaps and Public Policy Preferences -- The Significance of Gapology -- Appendix: Exit Polls, 1980-2012 -- Discussion Questions -- Index

An examination of how and why various US demographic groups are politically distinct and how these groups' behavior can influence public opinion, policy, and party positioning.

The discrepancy between taxing and spending -- The politics of taxing -- Raising taxes -- Cutting taxes -- The politics of spending -- The growth of government spending -- Reducing spending -- Deficits and the american democracy

Contemporary American politics is marked by an unusually substantial generation gap. This has important implications for the future of American politics as an overwhelmingly white and conservative generation, the Silent Generation, is being replaced in the electorate by much more diverse and liberal generations: the Millennial Generation and Generation Z. To project potential partisan changes in the American electorate with generational replacement, simulations were calculated estimating what the electorate may look like, using the 2016 presidential election as a baseline. Hypothesizing the same generational dynamics of vote choice and turnout for 2020 that existed in 2016, with generational replacement alone the national plurality of 2.1 percent for the Democratic candidate increases to 4.8 percent if Generation Z votes the same as Millennials. For elections beyond 2020, the potential partisan swing toward the Democrats based on generational replacement become even much more considerable. By 2032, Millennials and Generation Z combined are projected to consist of almost one‐half of the entire electorate. Even if Generation Z is not distinct from the rest of the electorate politically, given how strongly Democratic the Millennials are, the simulated gain for the Democrats in 2032 is 5 percent; and, if Generation Z becomes as Democratic leaning as Millennials are, the simulated swing toward the Democrats is greater than 7 percent.Related ArticlesCormack, Lindsey. 2019. "Leveraging Peer‐to‐Peer Connections to Increase Voter Participation in Local Elections." Politics & Policy 47 (2): 248‐266. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12297Shaykhutdinov, Renat. 2019. "Socialization, Rationality, and Age: Generational Gaps and the Attitudes toward the Chechen War in Russia." Politics & Policy 47 (5): 931‐955. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12323Stockemer, Daniel. 2016. "Is the Turnout Function in Democracies and Nondemocracies Alike or Different?" Politics & Policy 44 (5): 889‐915. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12174

The income gap—the difference in the political behavior of those with low- and high-income—in the 2008 presidential election was generally similar to what it had been for decades: the likelihood of voting Republican tended to increase with family income. I find two important attributes of the 2008 income gap. First, the size of the income gap varied significantly state to state. Second, analyzing American National Election Studies (ANES) data from 2008, Ifind that there clearly is an ideological divide in the United States on the basis of one's income on a number of public policy issues, though this division is not ideologically consistent from issue to issue. These results suggest that economic issues continue to be a primary motivating factor in determining how different income groups vote.

A significant departure for the conception of a consensual national political culture is proposed by Daniel Elazar. According to Elazar, the national political culture is the synthesis of three major political subcultures (individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic) that are dominant in varying parts of the country. Using American National Election Studies (ANES) data, this study finds that the partisan differences in the political subcultures are becoming more pronounced, especially among whites. Elazar's classification of political culture has become even more relevant to American politics in the twenty-first century than it was in the 1980s and 1990s. In particular, whites in traditionalistic states appear to be moving in a significantly more Republican direction than the nation as a whole. On the other end of the political spectrum, whites in states with moralistic subcultures tend to be becoming more Democratic. Relatedly, public policy preferences also vary considerably by subculture. Those in traditionalistic states are considerably more important on a number of non-economic issues, including gun control, abortion, and gay marriage than people in states with other dominant subcultures.

This study examines the extremely large generation gap in support for Donald Trump. Unquestionably, the generational gap in Twenty-First century American politics predates Trump. Yet, prior to the 2016 presidential election, it was widely held that any potential Republican nominee for president would have to do considerably better among Millennials than John McCain and Mitt Romney to have a chance of winning the general election. Instead of trying to woo younger Americans, however, Donald Trump's campaign to "Make America Great Again" suggests that his campaign stoked fears about generational societal change, and in doing so, overtly focused on winning the votes of older Americans nostalgic for the country of their youth. Problematically, since generation correlates with other demographic characteristics, the generation gap is in Trump's support may simply be a result of other divisions in American politics, such as race, education, religion, and gender. A multivariate analysis utilizing data from the Pew Research Center, however, demonstrates this is not the case. Generation is a robust predictor of presidential approval for Trump on its own. Consequently, Trump's lack of appeal to younger Americans, after Barack Obama so successfully wooed them, has become a defining characteristic of contemporary American politics.